My research interests lie in the intersection of computer science and economics. Specifically, I am interested in algorithmic game theory, computational social choice, and deep learning for game theoretic problems.
Selected Publications
HYBRID PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING: DIVISIBLE, INDIVISIBLE, AND BEYOND (AAMAS 2024)
I propose a model that encompasses divisible PB, indivisible PB, and many other variants in social choice as special cases. I proposed several objectives, algorithms, and proved their superior performance.
MAXMIN PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING (IJCAI 2022)
We studied the egalitarian participatory budgeting rule when the projects are indivisible and the preferences are dichotomous. We proved the hardness of the problem and proposed fixed parameter tractability for real-world motivated parameters. We also propose an additive approximation greedy algorithm and prove that it has an optimal empirical performance. On the axiomatic front, we proved that our rule satisifes many desirable axiomatic properties. The paper can be viewed here.
INDIVIDUAL-FAIR AND GROUP-FAIR SOCIAL CHOICE RULES UNDER SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES (AAMAS 2023)
We introduced two novel group-fairness notions for the framework with divisible PB and ordinal single-peaked preferences. Our notions envelop the existing notions in the literature as special cases. We provided a complete characterization of all the group-fair rules and provided families of fair rules that are computable in polynomial time.
INDIVISIBLE PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING WITH MULTIPLE DEGREES OF SOPHISTICATION OF PROJECTS (AAMAS 2023)
PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING WITH MULTIPLE DEGREES OF PROJECTS AND RANGED APPROVAL VOTES (IJCAI 2023)
We consider the case where each project can have a set of possible costs. The problem is to decide, for each project, the cost to be allocated to the project. Each voter approves a range of costs for each project. We propose four utility notions for this model. We computationally and axiomatically analyze the PB rules that maximize the total social welfare.
THE RULE-TOOL-USER NEXUS IN DIGITAL COLLECTIVE DECISIONS (AAMAS 2023)
PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING: FAIRNESS AND WELFARE MAXIMIZATION (EUMAS 2022)
INDIVISIBLE PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING UNDER INCOMPLETE WEAK RANKINGS (Working paper)
We introduced three families of rules for the case where the projects are indivisible and the preferences are weakly ordinal. We analyzed the computational complexity of each of these rules. We also conducted a thorough axiomatic analysis of these rules and proved that each of our families satisfies compelling axiomatic properties in social choice literature, including the properties defined for the voting frameworks under ordinal preferences and also participatory budgeting.
Ph.D. Courses
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Game Theory and Mechanism Design
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Design and Analysis of Algorithms
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Stochastic Models and Applications
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Graph Theory
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Automata Theory and Computability
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Computational Complexity Theory
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Approximation Algorithms